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Several authors have attempted recently to extend Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS)
theory to organizations and business management (Wheatley, 1992; Lind, 1994; Beccone,
1998; Zimmerman, Lindberg & Plsek, 1998, Eoyang & Olson , 2001). The theory might
be useful for practitioners, but it cannot provide detailed scientific predictions. The
following questions are posed for analysis: Could CAS theory be applied to hiring and
promoting leaders and managers? Would it be possible, and would it make sense, for
organizations to identify emergent leaders as management prospects given Beccone's
analysis of the distinction between leaders and managers? How might the procedures and
results likely differ from current practice? Is it possible to conduct empirical research
that supports or contradicts normative conclusions about whether applied CAS theory
works for selecting leaders and managers? This paper argues that applied CAS theory is
useful for identifying and selecting leaders and managers despite the predictive
limitations because it increases the probability of influencing organizational adaptations
in desirable directions.
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The thesis of this paper is that complex adaptive systems (CAS) theory may be
used to assist organizations in successfully adapting to their environments by selecting
between leaders and managers when filling formal management positions. Leaders wrll
be most effective at aligning and mobilizing decentralized organizations for change,
managers will be most effective at coordinating specialization and promoting efficiency.
Leaders and managers will be distinguished below using recognized patterns of
relationships. A combination of the patterns may be necessary for organizations to adapt
from particularly disorganized and competitive environments to more stable positions.
This application is a probabilistic improvement over current selection rnethods because ;i
uses identifiable environmental patterns and desirable patterns of organizational
adaptation to make formal managerial selections between leaders and managers rather
than assuming that one ideal type is suitable for all environments.
Studying leadership is by nature a multi-disciplinary task. Contemporary theories
of leadership focusing only on attributes of individuals, social groups, or environmental
factors miss important relationships and interactions occurring between scales of
analysis. The emergence of leadership and ascendance to authority may be interpreted
using theoretical constructs and models from many different disciplines at many scales of
analysis. The advantage of studying leadership within a complex adaptive systems
(CAS) framework is the ability to incorporate multiple scales of analysis and to identify
emergent environmental patterns and emergent organizational adaptations to those
environments. Academic complexity research provides insight into environmental
conditions, organizational adaptations, and patterns of human interaction involved in the
I
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emergence of leaders and managers as well as a comparative framework useful for
detailed analysis of leaders and leadership in general.
Several authors in recent years have attempted to extend the CAS theoretical
framework to Organization Theory and purposeful application in business management
(Wheatley,1992; Lind, 19941, Beccone, 1998; Zimmerman, Lindberg & Plsek, 1998,
Eoyang & Olson,2001). Indeed, the growing body of work in the "applied complexity"
area has been sufficient to spawn a number of works posing the question of whether these
applications of CAS theory are valid applied science or simply a "management fad"
(McKelvey, 1999; Stacey Griffin & Shaw, 2000). A casual search of a popular Internet
based bookstore site yielded over 700 titles with subject matter relating to complexity and
over 200 related specifically to complexity theory. Many of the business-oriented works
function at a very high and very abstract level of analysis, suggesting improvisational
management approaches based upon assumptions embracing continuous or1antzational
change. That is helpful, but what about tactical implementations of applied complexity
theory at an operational level?
The body of academic work of the Augsburg Center for Leadership Studies
includes two prominent theses directly related to CAS theory. Lind (1996) examines the
role of leaders in creating corporate metaphors using a chaosiadaptive systems
framework. Beccone (1998) presents a comprehensive review of the development of
CAS theory and an analysis of organizational leadership based largely upon distinctions
between leadership and management and between legitimate networks and shadow
networks within the larger systems (Stacey, 1996). Based on his critical review,
Beccone suggests that research into organizational leadership should focus on
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interactions and activities involving self-organized shadow networks, informal
organizational culture, and the creation of trust relationships within the informal culture.
AIso of particular interest for this effort is the distinction between leadership and
management(Zaleznik, 1977); leadership and management constitute agent roles in self-
organizing legitimate and shadow networks (Stacey, 1996).
Selection of leaders and managers is a logical starting point for CAS application
because of influences of the different roles; leaders are change agents and managers are
specialization and control agents. Leaders and managers both play significant roles as
agents influencing ways in which groups of people organize themselves to adapt to their
environments. Given that both roles are related to particular patterns of self-organization,
selection of leaders and managers is a logical starting point for application of Complex
Adaptive Systems theory incorporating principles of self-organization and emergence.
The following questions are posed for analysis: 1) Could CAS theories be applied to
hiring and promoting people to formal management positions? 2) If so, would it be
possible, and would it rnake sense, for organizations to identiff leaders of "shadow
networks" as management prospects given Beccone's analysis of the distinction between
leaders and managers? 3) If so, how would the procedures and results likely differ from
current practice? 4) Finally, given the unpredictability of systems inherent in the CAS
framework, is it possible to conduct empirical research that supports or contradicts
normative conclusions about the applicability of CAS theory to managerial hiring or its
efficacy?
Proposing answers to these questions will contribute to the field of leadership
studies and extend the body of work in the Center for Leadership Studies in an
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incremental but important way. A critical review and analysis of recent literature related
to the application of CAS theory to organizational behavior will determine whether there
has been rigorous research or application to supplement the works of Stac ey, Zaleznik,
and Beccone in the development of a hypothetical model informing manager selection. In
the academic sense, this work expands incrementally upon the work of others, including
works from the Augsburg Center for Leadership Studies, becoming a small piece of the
overall view. The results will begin to scope the applicability of Complex Adaptive
Systems theory at an operational level and suggest a method by which organizations may
enhance their prospects of successfully adapting to changing environments.
Complex Adaptive Systems Theory
In the behavioral sciences a system may be defined and modeled as "a set of
objects together with relationships between the objects and between their affrihutes"
which "functions as a whole by virtue of the interdependence of its parts" (Hall & Fagen,
1968, pp. 81-82). This behavioral systems subset of General Systems Theory (GST) is
used to model entities, relationships, and process flows. A method for modeling systems,
initially designed for analyzingpolitical systems, was constructed in 1968 using the
theories of: Hall & Fagen (1968), to define systems; Ashby (1968), to identiff principles
of self-orgmtzation in systems; Buckley (1968), to appty these principles to society; and,
Easton (1968), to apply these principles to political life. However, a comprehensive
general systems theory of leadership evaluation did not emerge. Although the works of
the earlier behavioral systems theorists are acknowledged, the focus in this work is the
terminology and approach of contemporary complexity theorists emphasizing self-
otgantzation. GST is arguably rooted in classical reductionist cause-effect epistemology
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(Stacey, Griffin & Shaw, 2000); the assertion is that objective observers may guide
organizations to predictable outcornes by simply manipulating leverage points in a
"formal" organization. For instance, management may attempt to increase the efficacy of
internal communications by formally appointing a communications manager to
implement formal communications protocols. Complexity theory shifts the emphasis
from objects to relationships, incorporating sensitive dependence on initial conditions,
influence across and between scales of analysis, and seltorganization into a participative
rather than a purely objective epistemology (Beccone, 1998; Stacey, 2001). In practice,
complexity theorists are more likely to emphasize informal channels of communication
(Stacey, 1996 & 2001).
The deparfure from General Systems Theory into complexity theory requires a
brief review of the conceptualization and classification of the "systems" upon which
complexity theory is based. Complexity theory is descended from chaos theory, which
classifies systems according to recognizahle patterns of behavior (Crockett, 1994).
There are four types of systems that can be identified by patterns described by
nefworks of relationships. Crockett (1994) cites Wolfram showing that systems may be
classified into four types: Group I systems are static and die out; Group II systems appear
to be periodic; Group III systems are chaotic and unpredictable; Group IV systems
(complex systems) are a mixture of Group II and Group III. Wolfram argues that Group
IV systems are unpredictable, yet CAS theory focuses on them to provide "broad"
explanations based upon their emergent patterns. Crockett also makes the argument that
Group II periodic systems are also unpredictable; because observation requires a limited
time frame, there is no certainfy that Group II systems will not deviate from penodicity in
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the future. Crockett's argument should not be limited to Group II because it may be
extended to Group IV systems. For instance, a Group IV complex system exists over
time but may collapse and die, leaving a Group I system; the universe itself, arguably a
Group IV system, may ultimately collapse. Humans and their organizations, arguably
Group IV systems, likewise have limited time frames; to paraphrase the economist John
Maynard Keynes, "In the long run, we are all Group I (dead)," although influence may
continue after one has died. All interesting, recognizable behaviors, from a systems
perspective, occur in the Group IV space befween chaos and periodicity. Complex
systems fall within the Group IV area between chaos and periodicity; the behavior is
interesting because it can be both unpredictable and stable. Handling the apparent
contradiction between unpredictability and stabilify is necessary to develop useful
applications of the theory.
This paper focuses on human organizations as complex adaplive systems. The
theory of adaptive Group IV systems, or complex adaptive systems (CAS theory),
enhances our ability to explain complex phenomena because of the underlying
assumption that all CAS's have common characteristics across scales and disciplines
(Waldrop, 1992). The common characteristics, especially the emergent large-scale
patterns, will allow development of approaches to adapt to and to influence those
patterns.
The emergence of chaos and complexity theories, as the basis for a new approach
to scientific research, is described by Gleick (1987). Gleick describes events in several
scientific disciplines that introduced the existence of unpredictability and chaotic
behaviors within subjects studied by traditional reductionist science. In systems like
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weather or national economies where small scales are intertwined with larger scales,
Gleick (1987, p.23) describes how "a chain of events can have a point of crisis that could
magniff small changes." Gleick describes this sensitive dependence on initial conditions,
also known as the butterfly effect, as an inescapable consequence of intertwined scales.
The words "chaos" and "complexity" are sometimes used interchangeably to
identifo the body of specialized systems research; as technical terms they describe
different phenomena. Cohen and Stewart (1994), describe chaos as complex behavior
resulting from simple, deterministic rules. Classical science loses explanatory and
predictive abilities when complex or unpredictable behavior results from seemingly
simple interactions. Complexity, within chaos theory, refers to understanding how
recognizable patterns emerge from the behavior of large, complicated systems based on
seemingly simple interactions. To use Gleick's example of the Lorenz approach to
weather prediction, chaos, specifically the butterlly effect, accounts for unpredictability
because events at very small scales influence events at large scales, like weather systems,
in ways that are impossible to predict.
Complexify, on the other hand, describes the continuous interaction and repeated
emergence from smaller scales of identifiable structures like frontal systems and
thunderstorms which are describable in terrns of their attributes and relationships even
though their "condition" at any particular time and place may be unpredictable (Gleick,
1987). "Complex adaptive systems" are a special type of complex system differing from
deterministic chaos systems: Waldrop (1998) identifies four primary features of complex
adaptive systems: l) a system consists of many independent agents interacting
simultaneously with pafferns emerging in response to competitive and cooperative
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relationships among the entities; 2) systems organize at multiple scales, systems at one
level forming entities at higher levels, rules and entities consistently changing and
organizing as the systern learns by reproducing and enhancing successful entities and
constructing new entities from existing ones by a process of prediction, feedback and
adaptation; 3) systems anticipate the future by the trial and error implicit in the second
point, behaving in anticipation of results derived from past situations; 4) systems contain
niches for specialization; because the environment is never static, there is never
"equilibrium." There is a requirement for constant adaptation which implies "perpetual
novelty" (Waldrop, 1998, p. 1a7).
There are several additional important features characteristic of complex adaptive
systems described by Waldrop (1998), Gleick (1987), Cohen & Stewart (1994) and others
summarized here. Iteration is the continuation of system processes over time; learning
occurs as systems adapt over multiple iterations. Attractors are regions of phase space
that describe the possible states of a system in particular points of time; a particular
system state is represented at a point in time by a point. The possible states of a given
system may be graphically portrayed as a pattern determined by the effects of attractors
influencing the graphical positions of the points through multiple iterations. Feedback is
a self-referential process' positive feedback reinforcing successful entities or behaviors
over multiple iterations, negative feedback eliminating unsuccessful entities and
behaviors. Complex adaptive systems have more or less permeable boundaries,
allowing passage of new "extemal" entities to interact (to be internalized) in the system
and allowing internal entities to interact in other systems. The amount of permeability is
also described as the openness of the system. The butterfly effect occurs when entities
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exert influence on external system states across scales. The butterfly effect and self-
organization are examples of emergence; systems have emergent qualities, meaning that
new patterns or entities may emerge at one level because of interactions at other levels.
Beccone argues that leadership is an emergent phenomenon (1998). Self-organization
(autopoeiesis, or autocatalysis) describes the abiliry of systems to spontaneously generate
themselves from previously unorganized entities, the ability of entities to self-organize
into new systems, or the tendency of order to emerge from chaos. Kauffinan (1995)
explains how the ability of entities to relate to each other becomes mathematically more
important than the actual number of unique entity ffies for the formation of autocatalytic
sets.
Kauffman's analysis of the importance of relationships is an important concept
for social organization because it applies to people. People are able to develop multiple
relationships, forming webs of interconnected groups that generate emergent patterns at
higher scales of analysis, Iike groups, small businesses, large corporations and entire
markets. Self-organized webs of interconnected groups are the source of organization
itself and of organizational adaptations to changing environments. Recognizing emergent
leadership and management in recurrent self-organized patterns will be helpful for filling
formal management positions and influencing desirable organizational adaptations
because leaders and managers influence adaptation in different directions.
Organizational Models
Organizations may be "mapped" to models of, or modeled as, self-organizing
complex adaptive systems. "Mapping" refers to specific parts of organizations having
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specific counterparts in the generalized complexity models. Altematively, general
concepts of complexity theory such as "emergence" and "self-organization" may be
used metaphorically to describe and explain organizations without directly mapping
relationship between counterparts. Researchers may also use the term "metaphor" to
reinforce the notion that a CAS is a human invention that has no physical reality -
whereas the organization does - and that CAS can serve only as a metaphorical
descriptor. Metaphors, unlike formal models, are based upon implicit information or
meaning imparted by the receiver of the information (Holland, 1998; Lind, 1994). The
distinction is important to the epistemology of theory. The following application
framework uses the term "model," indicating a mapping function, with the understanding
that the linkage between the abstract CAS and real world organizations is asserted. I will
argue below that for application in the case of managerial placement, whether we think in
terms of model or metaphor is of little relevance.
When CAS theory is applied, organizations and their constituent parts are mapped
to models at multiple scales, each scale incorporating agents, networks and an external
environment. Agents are independent and identifiable; they act according to rules or
strategies derived from experience. As such, agents (individual people or networks of
people) implicitly or explicitly make predictions, including predictions about the
behaviors of other agents, based on limited and imperfect information. This places
human agents in a condition of bounded rationality. An agent may be a member of many
networks. Networks are defined by patterns of agent relationships and may be classified
as either legitimate networks (formally recognized as a part of the official structure of the
organization), or shadow networks (informally organized nefworks) (Stacey, 1996).
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Networks coincide and overlap. At each level of analysis, networks will have emergent
"tags;" emergent leaders or formal rnanagers are tags that serve both as identifiers to
observers and as network organizers or adhesion points (Holland , 1995 & 1998).
Things, people, and relationships existing outside a given network make up the
environment. Networks have perrneable or semi-permeable boundaries; agents and
information affecting agents' strategies move about in and between networks and
throughout environments at multiple scales of analysis. The emergent pafferns upon
which this paper is focused, those of self organized groups "tagged" by leaders and
formal maflagers, are patterns formed by the interrelations between people and groups of
people at multiple scales of analysis.
A short description of interactions in those "scales of analysis" will clarify the
idea of interaction between scales. At the first selected level of analysis, people are
regarded as agents and sub-corporate groups. A formal *'section" level workgroup
composed of a manager/supervisor would be a legitimate network, as would a small
business not broken into sections or divisions. Social groups, cliques, and other informal
nefworks of associations are considered to be "shadow" networks (Stacey,1996). Due to
their informality (related to a Iessor number of rules) shadow networks generally allow
for higher levels of creativity and localized leadership emergence than legitimate
networks. Competitive tension between the shadow networks and legitimate networks is
a source of organizational change. (Stacey, 1996).
The interactions are continuous within and hetween lower and higher scales of
analysis. Higher level social organizations, or "meta-networks" would include, for
instance, divisions made up of sections. Meta-meta networks might include corporations
Augsburg Coltege Library
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made up of divisions, and entire markets make up an even higher level network.
Emergent patterns in higher level nefworks affect lower level networks as aspects of the
environment and each higher level is made up of lower levels that create emergent effects
observable at the higher level. In other words, events and processes taking place in lower
Ievel networks are represented as internal influences of agents in higher level networks.
What happens in small work groups may have an observable influence throughout a large
corporation. There are many scales of analysis, all of which have some influence upon
each other. The multiple scales increase the difficulty of explaining or predicting events
at any scale; however, emergent patterns do enable an understanding of the mufual
influences befween scales and rnay inform adaptation to those influences. This helps to
explain why appointing emergent leaders or managers to formal management positions
may influence how an organization adapts to its environment.
Could CAS Models be Applied to Hiring and Promoting Managersl
The previous section identified how models based on CAS theory are capable of
describing interactions between people, organizations, and parts of organizations, which
create observable emergent patterns. Before an attempt is made to describe a specific
model that could be used to select between leaders and managers for formal management
positions based on recognition of emergent pattems, it is important to establish that
applying abstract CAS models to organizations is an acceptable approach.
The process of filling formal management positions is a prime candidate for
applied CAS theory. One reason is that leaders are selected within informal networks of
people by the mutual informal consent of the other group members, the followers, in a
self-organizing process ' (Beccone, l99B). Beccone's analysis makes the distinction that
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"managers are appointed, leaders emerge" (1998, Title Page). An appointment to a
formal management position is also a kind of emergence - with an important difference:
In the case of the manager, the appointment is an emergence from an extemal or higher-
level, self-organized, formal and "legitirnate," network. For instance, when people select
a formal manager for a company, that newly appointed forrnal manager is emerging from
the self-organizing process of that company in new pattem of formal relationships with
the other people of the corporation. Formal managers are appointed for a purpose.
Selecting people for formal management positions, populating and structuring the
legitimate network, is an interesting and potentially critical part of the self-organizing
process because relationships with and between emergent leaders and formal managers
will influence patterns of adaptation for the organization. CAS theory is adapted well for
the purpose of analyzing such complex and interrelated patterns.
In addition to observing and understanding the patterns, it is important to
determine whether it is possible to intentionally influence the way in which legitimate
networks, and combinations of shadows and legitimate networks, organize themselves. Is
it possible to intentionally influence or improve the way an organization adapts to change
by appointing an emergent leader to a formal management position? Can emergent
leaders be identified, and if so, should they be appointed as managers in the legitimate
network given the distinction between roles? Is it possible and valid to answer the
questions using CAS theory?
Answering the question of intentional influence requires answering two
underlying questions. First, is CAS theory applicable to organizational theory? Second,
if it is, is there a model or set of models to use to inform manager selection?
t4
Applying CAS Models
There are two strong generic arguments against applying CAS models to
organizations. The first is that the metaphorical nature of the model leaves out human
freedom as a teleological factor, creating unpredictability, and CAS are by their nature
unpredictable. A model will not be much help in selecting managers if it can'tpredict
anything. The second is that CAS theory is in its infancy and that organizational CAS
theory is not sufficiently developed. Why should practitioners go ahead and apply CAS
theory anyway?
The f,rrst question is based upon an epistemic disagreement between academics
represented by the "Santa Fe" and "European" Schools (Marion & Bacon, 2000) that has
emerged since Beccone's analysis of Stacey's work. This is important because the
disagreement between theorists could doom this applied work if the disagreement is
relevant to application. I will argue that the epistemological basis for the disagreement is
of secondary importance in applying CAS theory to organizations.
The Santa Fe school, represented here by Holland (1998) advocates the use of
computer modeling as a basis of understanding universal rules and patterns inherent in
nature; complexity is regarded as a physical universal something like gravity. The Santa
Fe School usually develops computer models, tests them, and adjusts the rnodels. The
adjusted models may be used to used in application to predict patterns in networks or
systems like the insurance industry or the stock market.
The European school, represented here by Stacey, argues that human systems are
inherently different than other systems because humans have free will (Stacey, Griffin &
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Shaw,2000). They object to the use of "statistical noise" to generate unpredictability in
the models. Because of this, they argue, no computer model is capable of prediction
when applied to human systems. Therefore, it is argued, CAS theory may only be used
metaphorically in application (Stacey, Griffin & Shaw, 2000).
The objections of the European school do not apply to Santa Fe
methodology or to this particular application for three reasons:
l) Holland and others of the Santa Fe school use game theory and the
assumption that agents adapt to each other based upon experience, rather than
using statistical noise, to produce self-organizing emergent effects (Holland, 1995
& 1998; Arthur, Durlauf, & Lane, 1997; Darley & Kauffman, 1997). This
application project proceeds from the assumption that people are acting in a
condition of bounded rationality, basing behaviors upon attempts to predict other
people's behaviors and upon learned experience. The objection to statistical noise
as a replacement for free will does not apply.
2) Despite of the objections of the European school about the inability of
modeling to achieve prediction, the Santa Fe method described by Holland (1998)
is applied successfully by other practitioners of the Santa Fe school to predict
consumer credit behavior and personal bankruptcies. It is also used for chemical
process control, fraud detection and scheduling for large process centers (Ditlea,
1997; Wakefield, 2001). The level of prediction is non-specific and probabilistic,
based upon recurrent emergent patterns. This type of analysis does not predict the
specific outcomes of individual events, but the empirical evidence of successful
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application destroys the assertions of the European school about the
inapplicabi Iity of computer modeling.
3) It makes little difference to this particular effort whether we think in
terms of models or rnetaphors. Although the paper is generally based upon the
assumptions and the analysis of the Santa Fe school, there is no computer model
and no claim here of any ability to predict the specific outcomes of particular
strategies. All that is argued is that practitioners will be able to enhance their
chances (in a probabilistic sense consistent with the Santa Fe methodology) to
influence organizational adaptations using CAS to detect and influence pattems.
That is not an attempt to predict the specific adaptations, it is a means of
predicting general patterns of adaptation based upon general patterns of human
relationships. From this perspective, our interpretation of CAS might just as well
be based upon using complexity as a metaphor, because the emergent pattems are
the same whether we treat them as metaphors or as mappings. Based upon the
first two arguments above, however, this paper will proceed from the Santa Fe
assumptions and analysis with the assertion that they are rigorous and they are
verified empirically in other areas of human organization application.
This work focuses on identiffing and predicting emergent pattems, not
predicting precise events. A scientific level of prediction is not required for
application; predicting hurnan behavior is probabilistic, aggregated, and based on
past performance. It is subject to irrationality and novelty. Surprisingly, it works
most of the time, even though predicting individual behavior from statistical
probability is fallacious. People have to make guesses. Making good guesses
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improves the chances of selecting formal managers who will influence patterns of
adaptation effectively. Therefore, the first objection to applying CAS theory,
coming from the European school, may be safely disregarded based on the
arguments that the Santa Fe method works and that the objection does not apply
to this particular efforl.
The second objection to applying CAS theory to organizations comes from
Holland of the Santa Fe School. Holland (1995, l99B) argues that because the
science of complexity is relatively new and the computer-based models have not
been sufficiently mapped to organtzations, application to organizational
development is premature in comparison to work in economics and finance.
My reply is that ony rmprovernent works for application, even if the science
comes later. It is already possible to see some of the patterns and the mappings
intuitively. They need to be applied to validate, adjust, and customize the models.
Thus, the processes of experimentation and applying theory (metaphorical or not)
to organizations might just as well run in parallel with academic theory development
rather than waiting for a complete theory to emerge. Holland is quoted making this point
in Wakefield:
"Before we had a theory of electromagnetism, we had a lot of experirnents by
clever people like English physicist Michael Faraday," Holland says. "'W'e sprinkled iron
on top of magnets and built a repertoire of tools and effects." While academicians search
for an elusive, perhaps nonexistent, overarching theory of complexity, many derivative
tools are proving profitable in industry (2000, pp. 3-4).
Applying an incomplete theory may still yield improved results for the
practitioner. If not, the practitioner has gained valuable experience for guiding the next
application (in the agent sense - they are still working in logical fallacies), and, as a by-
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product, the scientist may benefit from seeing what happens. Besides, parallel
development also makes sense from the perspective that CAS theory is inherently
participative (Stacey, Griffin & Shaw, 2000).
Even though applying complexity models or metaphors to organizations will not
yield highly specific predictions, an enhanced ability to recognize specific patterns is
useful in rnaking decisions requiring people to make guesses, including selecting between
leaders or managers. Even if the theory is still being developed, people should
experiment by applying the theory, perhaps improve their guesses, and contribute to the
development of the development of the theory. The conclusion is that CAS theory in
general may be constructively applied to organizations. Could we now synthesize a
model that would inform manager selection based upon emergent pattems to influencs
organizational adaptation?
Leader-Manager Selection Model - What is Required?
A number of steps are proposed for a process incorporating CAS to inform
manager selection. The first step is to define the primary network under consideration.
The next step is describing the environment in which the primary network exists. The
third is to determine the current meta-state and direction of the network. The fourth is to
determine the desired meta-state and direction of the network. The fifth is to identiff the
ideal approach for a new agent to influence the direction of the network. Finally, the
candidate evaluation needs to be defined.
Step One: Define the Network
People ("agents" within the model) using CAS theory to inform hiring must first
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define the network into which a manager is being appointed and the boundary between
the network and the environment. The first order network is the unit to which the
manager is being appointed, whether that is a team, section, proprietorship, division,
department, or entire enterprise (executive). The higher order environmental meta-
networks consist of all networks containing the first order network (as a division might
contain a section or a department might contain divisions). If an executive is being
selected, the entire organization may be the first order nefwork. The rest of the
environment consists of all external relationships including higher levels, other
organtzations, markets, economies, and all other influences.
The idea that systems or networks are self-organizing is central to this paper. An
important distinction needs to be made between interpretations of self-organization,
particularly in social or political systems including organizations. Analysts may find a
lack of self-organization at a given scale or in a given network (Wheatley, 1992) because
the network definition excludes leader agents or other network agents from the network.
A meta-system or network may be modeled in a variety of ways - the distinctions are the
product of human rationalify rather than being necessarily part of physical reality (Pirsig,
1974). It is important that people selecting managers are considered agents in the
selection process and that managers are considered agents and tags. It should not be
assumed that anyone can objectively observe and independently tune networks (Stacey,
Griffin and Shaw, 2000; Stacey, 2001). Definitions must be broad enough to recognize
self-organization and agency.
Sometimes network definitions are too narrow, making it seem as if external
forces direct networks. Shalizi's (1999) analysis of a panel discussion on emergence in
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Eastern Europe focuses on the idea that communism was an unnatural, non-self-
organized system that was externally imposed by Russian communists of the USSR.
Wheatley (1992) likewise asserts the value of leaders applying chaos principles,
externally creating and influencing self-organized, self directed teams to create a more
"organic" organization. An even more holistic approach to observing and interacting
with these systems, which better recognizes the permeability of system boundaries, is to
expand the scale of inquiry to include leaders and competing systems within the scope of
inquiry. From this perspective, the national social system agents perceived by Shalizi to
be extemally organized become part of the interaction, competition, and self-organization
of social subsystem agents within the Eastern European system.
Therefore, network definitions should account for self-organization. A leader or
manager does not direct externally, but participates from within in the systematic self-
organtzation of self-directed teams (and any associated shadows). Although both wider
and narrower models have some validity, the advantage of a wider-scale interpretation is
that it is consistent with the notion that CAS operate at all scales simultaneously in a
universal phenomenon and that CAS's have permeable boundaries. Control (negative
feedback) structures may be coercive without being external to a self-organized system.
In this analysis, a coercive executive is still regarded as an agent withina network. Self-
organization should be exposed rather than being attributed to external forces, which fall
outside the scope of inquiry and are therefore poorly explained.
The issue of distinguishing self-organized versus not self-organized forms of
organizations may be resolved in a similar way; all organizations are self-organized at
some level. Wheatley's criticism of organizational hierarchies as inorganic or less
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organic than self-organized groups applies only if one defines the imposition of
hierarchies outside the system of social self-organization, thereby assuming that
hierarchies are not self-organized, begging the question of where they do come from.
This part of Wheatley's CAS model is empirically invalid because self-organized
hierarchies occur frequently in nature as in hurnan organizations. Researchers have
observed self-organized political hierarchies of various great ape communities (Wilhoite,
1976; de Waal ,1982,1989; Fouts & Mills, 1997). Gardner (1995) likewise addresses the
tendency of humans to organize into social hierarchies as a result of the evolutionary
primate heritage" Boisot and Cohen (2000, p. 129) observe that "in bothbiological and
social systems, hierarchies are bottom-up emergent outcomes in complex organization.
In both cases, however, once they have been created, hierarchies act in a top-down
fashion to constrain and thus to further organize the systern. This is also true of social
networks." This Ieads directly to the conclusion that even rigidly hierarchical legitimate
networks are self-organized.
A study of self-organized groups is likely to find self-organized hierarchical
social stratification between the members of such groups. Once again, the advantage
here lies in defining the scope of the model wide enough to account for the system-states.
If we def,rne social hierarchies as inorganically imposed, this begs the question of where
they come from; they come from individual and group behaviors of social creatures. The
tendency to self-organize hierarchies, far from being inorganic, is a consistent theme
among social animals, including humans, which would seem to indicate the presence of
an "atLractor" to this meta-equilibrium system state. A social hierarchy is likely to
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emerge within a self-directed work group or a shadow network. Hierarchies are not
unique to organization charts.
This is not to argue that hierarchies are necessarily superior evolutionary
structures or even that they are desirable. Flattening hierarchies may be very desirable to
participants in an organization and to the goals of that organization; there may be strong
attractors to non-hierarchical or less-hierarchical system states or meta-equilibria. The
behavioral atfractors might be genetic or cultural. However, "tightness of coupling" and
"creative ability" are arguably superior to "organic" or "holistic" in describing the
relative desirability of particular system states at a given point in tirne, hierarchical or
otherwise. Defining specific desirable system states as opposed to general pafferns is not
the primary topic of this paper, but issues of desirability and holism deserve expanded
treatment within the body of leadership research.
Step 2: Describe the environment state
The environment consists of the meta-networks (like the greater corporation
outside the network in question) and meta-meta-networks (like the martket in which an
organinzation functions) and the rest of the world beyond the boundary of the network
into which the manager is being appointed (the primary network). The environment is
important because it creates the niche into which the network must adapt. Is it fast-paced
and chaotic, somewhat chaotic, or is it somewhat slower? Does it seem to be speeding up
or slowing down? Are there many agents or few? Is the number of agents growing or
shrinking? Are the agents large or small? Do they seem to be increasing in size or
decreasing?
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Marion describes a means of classiflzing environments into four types over a
continuum based on Population Ecology Theory and CAS based on the work of Emery
and Trist (Marion, 1999, pp. 180-182). These are not the same as Wolfram's fypes of
systems mentioned above; they are classifications of environments within which
networks of adaptive agents function. A graphical depiction of organizational
environments appears in figure I on page 57.
Type I environments are stable and dispersed. There is little competition and little
interaction. The environment is unchanging, and there is little to learn. An organization
would need to be very large to survive here. Order is not likely to emerge. Information
is unusable; every situation requires different rules. Organizations approaching Type I
would be legalistic and administrative with dispersed authority like a large monopoly or a
large bureaucracy. Think of the Federal Government, the Internal Revenue Service, and
the tax code.
Type II environments are stable and concentrated. Organizations in Type II will
be successful by learning. hletworks form in clumps. Specialization is rewarded.
Strategy is useful. There are extensive rules and constraints. Creativity will occur in
specialized local networks. Organizations in this environment will tend toward loosely
coupled networks. Coupling will be further explained below.
Type III environments are further concentrated. There is likely to be a higher
density of organizations and more intense competition. Size is an advantage because
power is important, but agents and networks must adapt quickly, so coupling is tighter
and creativity is emphasized.
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Type IV environments are concentrated and turbulent. There may be incentives
to break rules or trick competitors, even if selfish strategies destabilize the meta-system.
There are few rules because change is too quick for retention. Agents, networks and
organizations tending toward Type IV are likely small. New markets with numerous
start-ups are likely to begin in a near- Type IV environments and then tend toward Type
III and Type II as they mature. These changing environments are likely to require
different network adaptations, combining the manager and leader roles in moving into the
initial phases of specialization.
Step 3: Describe the Network State.
Because of the composite nature of CAS, networks may be described in much the
same way that environments are described using the approach identified in Marion
( I eee).
A well-adapted primary network in a Type II environment would likely be highly
specialized. It would likely be part of a large meta-network that changed slowly, much
like the environment itself. Although the primary network may be more or less creative
and change-oriented depending on perspective (section, division, department or
enterprise), changes and creativify will be most likely to occur in the lower level
networks. A well-adapted network in a Type III Environment would likely be growing or
large, powerful, highly competitive and able to change quickly to take advantage of
opportunities in a quickly changing environment. Microsoft, prior to the last economic
slowdown, provides an example of a large company, in a crowded, competitive, and
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resource-rich environment, that was able to jump quickly into new sub-markets (usually
software) and dominate or consume the competition.
"Coupling" describes how agents and nefworks interact and affect each other's
behavior. Coupling between agents and networks influences the transmission of creativity
and the speed of change. Tight coupling suggests a high level of interdependence; loose
coupling suggests relative insulation. Tight coupling suggests efficient communications,
faster change and an adaptation to a Type III environment. Loose coupling suggests
slower communications, slower change and a Type II orientation to the environment.
Tight coupling suggests rapid adaptation; loose coupling suggests expansive adaptation.
Tightly coupled networks are able to quickly exploit new opportunities; loosely coupled
networks are rnore likely to survive lean times. The way that agents and networks are
coupled describes how a higher-level meta-network is has adapted to its environment at
lower levels.
An application of coupling may be descnbed using a corporate example. A
tightly coupled corporation exhibits central control, which allows the corporation to
change quickly. A loosely coupled corporation would more likely be decentralized with
several seemingly independent divisions, each having its own external contacts with the
environment. Coupling may be looser or greater on a conceptual continuum, and large
organizations would likely exhibit mixed couplings. For instance, it is likely that an
accounting department, even in a tightly coupled organization, would exhibit evidence of
loose coupling, relying on external standards and rules beyond the control of the
corporation. Conversely, a marketing department may be more tightly coupled, allowing
quick changes and a direct tie to the corporate identity as manifested by a legitimate
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central management network. It is likely that these couplings, in abstract models or in
arganrzational examples are constantly changing, the tightly coupled states changing
more quickly than the loosely coupled states.
The constant changes are described in the abstract by models exhibiting "meta-
equilibrium states;" systems or networks tend toward meta-equilibrium states within their
environments. These states are dynamic. Nash equilibrium states represent a sort of
conformity that minimizes losses and stabilizes a network to the benefit of the agents or
networks in a niche. Meta equilibria are representative of relatively stable relationships.
There are usually many potential meta-equilibrium states, some more desirable than
others based upon relationship with the changing environment. Networks may move
from meta-equilibrium to meta-equilibrium. Darley and Kauffinan demonstrate that there
is a natural tendency or "an attracting state on or around the edge of chaos" (1997 , p.
48).
Application of Game Theory to CAS models suggests that there are coupling
cycles or meta-equilibrium cycles inherent in self-organized systems of agents adapting
their strategies based upon anticipated behaviors of others. Research suggests that as
agent strategies emerge, they become generally known to other agents. As time goes on,
agents' predictions become increasingly precise, in effect hardening their expectations
and tuning the system to meta-equilibrium. Because of bounded rationality, eventually
the predictions become too precise. The experience of the failed predictions is followed
by in a period of unpredictability as agents attempt to adjust their expectations and
behaviors (Darley and Kauffman, 1997). It might be expected that the cycles would tend
to occur more quickly in tightly coupled networks because of the faster pace of change
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and more efficient communications. Loosely coupled systems can become "sfuck" and
may be immovable (Stacey, 1996).
Step 4: Describe the Desired Network State
The description of the network state for the purpose of this exercise is binary.
Should the network be more tightly coupled, implying alignment through leadership?
Should the network be more loosely coupled, implying specialization and management?
Selecting leaders and managers is in itself a part of the inherent, ongoing self-
organizing process of adapting to the environment. The network should adapt to changes
in the environment and the network should be protected from internal and external
threats. Proceeding from Marion's work, it is possible to suggest desired states that may
enhance adaptability to particular conditions (1999). A nefwork should be more tightly
coupled in response to resource rich, competitive environments requiring applied
creativity. For example , if a new market niche is created, companies need to move
quickly to exploit new opportunities; or, loosely coupled corporations rnay desire tightly
coupled subsidiaries or divisions. A network should be more loosely coupled in response
to resource-poor environments, using specialization to more efficiently find and exploit
scarce resources; or, an alternative response may be to couple tightly in preparation for an
attempt to change markets. Marketing and sales divisions may need to be more tightly
coupled with few rules to be fast and competitive, while accounting and legal
departments need to be more loosely coupled and specialized, incorporating more rules to
ensure accountability.
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The desired state is necessarily a non-objective view of an agent participating in
the selection process. Persons participating in the selection process are agents in another
self-organizing process that will result in the emergence of a manager for the formal
network: they organize themselves to make the selection, and they are part of the higher
level self organization as a formal manager emerges the higher level legitimate network.
The game-theoretical basis of the abstract models suggests that the agents at some point
understand that what benefits the network benefits the agents. That does not preclude an
agent from cheating, or attempting to manipulate the network for specific personal gain.
ln terms of application, that means that it would be expected that sometimes people might
try to manipulate the system for personal gain. Applying CAS does not eliminate this
possibility, but recognizing that agents are employing self-generated strategies in the
abstract serves as a reminder to participants in selection processes that people may have
personal stakes in the outcomes. Therefore a degree of caution is wise in deciding how
loosely or tightly networks should be coupled, what adaptation approaches should be
used, and who should implement them.
Step 5: Describe the ldeal Approach
Would it be possible, and would it make sense, for organizations to identiff
leaders of shadow systems as management prospects given Beccone's analysis of the
distinction between leaders and managers? Based on the network, the environment, the
current condition of the network, and the desired direction of the network, it may be
advisable to select a leader, a manager or a combination of both for a formal management
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position within the legitimate network. The selection is dependent upon the kind of
adaptation that is desired.
The distinction between managers and leaders has direct implications for how
networks adapt to their environments. Managers are agents of control and specialization,
and leaders are change agents (Beccone, 1998; Zaleznrk, 1977). Managers, therefore,
imply loosely coupled approaches for adapting networks to the environment. Leaders
irnply tightly coupled adaptive approaches within a nefwork. It follows that manager-
leaders imply change agents who create alignment within a nefwork in the direction of
higher specialization and decentralization. The direction of influence is indicated on the
graphical model in figure l, page 57.
The type selected depends on the desired state of the network. In general, if the
desired system state rnoves in the direction from adapting to a Type II to adapting to a
Type III environment, from loosely coupled to tightly coupled, in effect aligning the
corporation, then a "leader" is more desirable. A leader will likely upset the existing
meta-equilibrium of employee strategies and expectations, enhance the spread of creative
ideas through enhanced communication channels, and perhaps provide comfort with the
changes. A revolution may be required rather than an incremental shift because of the
relative change resistance of the loosely coupled system (Center for Applied research,
1994; Stacey, 1996). If, on the other hand, an adaptation moving from a Type III
adaptation to a Type II adaptation is desired, or if the movement is a desired maturation
from a Type IV adaptation to a Type III environment, then a management approach is
desirable.
30
A good example the leader-manager is in the introduction of "scientific
management" to industry in the early 1990's where the introduction of rules and
standardization decreased the complexity of the existing system and enabled learning
ands adaptation at a greater pace (Taylor, 1916). Taylor's description of the science of
shoveling is instructive. He suggests that it makes sense to determine the best ways
through trial and error and use them; organizations should experiment freely (Taylor,
l9l6). Scientific management in a chaotic environment is a creative form of self-
organization and reduction of complexity to enable tighter coupling and change;
standardization introduces rules where uncoupled agents had previously all followed
individual sets of rules. It is a means of getting to the edge of chaos from the chaotic
side. lntroducing scientific management and rules of standardization are examples of
adaptations requiring a network to align around a leader-manager in favor of specialized,
decentralizing tendenci es.
In addition to organizational changes that are responses to external environments,
like the tightening and loosening of couplings mentioned above, CAS theory suggests
that such loosening and tightening may result from purely internal dynamics.
Management brings incremental improvement, specialization, administration, and rule
promulgation, whereas leadership hrings tight coupling and change. Cycles modeled by
Darley and Kauffman mentioned above suggest that movement in either direction is
likely regardless of external influences because of agents expectations and predictions
about each others behaviors (1997).
The abstract model of adaptive agents guessing each other's behaviors rnay be
applied directly to human organizations. Within an organization, there may be rules and
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expectations developed, perhaps based upon a corporate vision or mission, that make it
possible to predict what individuals or groups will behave. Practice may become
increasingly rigid. Eventually, a creative change is likely to cause side effects to ripple
through the nefwork. There may be adaptations to the vision or mission. In practice,
both leader and man agff roles are endemic to ongoing self-organization processes.
Leaders are emergent in the process of attacking a meta-equilibrium (as a set of
expectations) and in the initial formation of a new meta-equilibrium (new expectations or
alignment); managers are emergent in the implementation and the defense of the new
meta-equilibrium (increasingly specialized expectations and decentralized decisions). In
this view there is an internal cycle based on a nafural disequilibrium which may be
expected in human organizations as well as computer models.
An interesting consequence of the emergence of internal and external cycles is the
potential combination of cycles. Take, for example, a hypothetical technology company
that was tightening couplings for competition in a Type III environment when a recession
hit and the environment jumped to Type II. Centralized creativity might be of little help
in a market where there is now no demand for new products. Lacking efficiency and
decenkalized connections or markets, the tightly coupled company caught moving in the
wrong direction might be doomed. Conversely a decentralized, Ioosely coupled
organization could be in trouble if a market was to shift from Type II to Type III.
Imagine a large, loosely coupled business machine company that is unable to react
quickly to Type III developments in multiple technology markets in which it competes.
If unable to tightly couple the entire organization, it will need to have tightly coupled
divisions to compete in each of the markets or to give up markets and consequently
32
divisions for lost. Persistent disequilibrium leads to the conclusion that leaders are
important in intemal or external adaptations and they more important in situations where
internal and external states are moving in different directions, requiring a realignment of
internal direction, perhaps even for the survival of the organization.
Recognition of inherent disequilibrium in the internal dynamics of networks also
plays an important role in identifyirug leaders. The internal cycle based on natural
disequilibrium rnodeled by Darley and Kauffman is very compatible with Stacey's
description of the development of shadow networks in response to legitimate networks
(Stacey 1996). Stacey describes the development of a shadow network operating in
dialectical opposition with the legitirnate network, which results in leadership emergence
and creativity - enabling adaptive change in the legitimate network. I would assert that
there may be multiple shadow nefworks and multiple levels of shadow networks, based
on the description of self organized networks within networks, referred by Marion to as
"the square root rule principal" (1999). In comparison with Darley and Kauffrnan,
Stacey's shadow network relates to the undermining of agent expectations in the network
resulting in unpredictability and creativity. Stacey describes an applied view of lower
level process influencing emergent patterns also observed by Darley and Kauffman using
abstract agents. They define the networks differently, but the processes are compatible.
As noted above, differing interpretations of network boundaries describing the same
subject may be equally valid. Given Stacey's legitimate-shadow dialectic, which I would
describe as "multilectic" given the multiplicify of potential agents and strategies, it is
reasonable to expect networks tighten and loosen periodically based upon the evolving
expectations and adaptations in the interplay of legitimate and shadow networks at
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multiple levels of analysis. In Stacey's applied sense, the predictions and expectations
are about behaviors of and within the organization. It is important for leadership
selection that emergent leaders may be identified as strategically related agents when
networks form or tighten within these ongoing processes.
If it is sometimes advisable to select an emergent leader for a formal management
position, it is essential to be able to identiff one. Relationships and behaviors of groups
of human agents identiff leaders in the shadow systems. There are indicators of
emergent Ieadership that may be observed (Beccone, 1998). Boundary spanning activity
occurs when a person is engaged in activities with people that would be considered
outside the usual social group. Flocking behavior occurs when groups of people flock to
another person; if a group of people flock to someone following a problem or crisis, that
person is probably a leader. Beccone and Zaleznik offer extensive descriptions of
observable leadership behaviors. Applied CAS theory may be inherently slanted toward
selections from within a given enterprise because of the reliance on observable behaviors.
Even so, the conclusion is that it is possible to identify leaders of informal shadow
networks by observing patterns of individual and group behavior.
Therefore it is possible to use CAS theory to develop a model approach for
selecting leaders and managers. It has been noted throughout that events are likely to be
unpredictable when using CAS theory to inform leadership and management selection.
But the outcomes are unpredictable regardless of what process is used to select leaders or
managers; using a management control approach to manager selection does not alter the
inherent unpredictabilify of the organizational world, it just leads to increasingly loosely
coupled networks. Using a an applied method that embraces uncertainty as an inherent
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part of ongoing self-organizing processes yields a better chance of adapting to emerging
patterns in the environment than adhering rigidly to assertions that either management
control or inspired leadership is the best adaptation for every situation.
Sometimes a management network may want to co-opt the internal opposition.
Selznik (1948, p.128-129) describes co-optation as, "the process of absorbing new
elernents into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a
means of averting threats to its stability or existence." This is a case where the Iegitimate
nefwork may attempt to identiff and select an emergent leader from the shadow networks
as a means of reducing the opposition or attaining "buy-in" from followers. For instance,
in the case of an unpopular policy, management may co-opt the opposition by appointing
someone perceived to be a leader among the staff to lead the team implementing the
policy.
Selznik's definition of co-optation is consistent with the idea of tension between
legitimate networks and shadow networks developed by Stacey (1996). Stacey describes
the tension between the shadow network and the legitimate network as a source of
creativity; Selznik describes the tension between formal authority and social power. ln
both analyses this tension is an important source of organizational change. The
organizational changes resulting from co-optation might be predictable or not. The
legitimate network may co-opt a leader by appointing that person to a formal
management position in the legitimate network. That may ease the tensions with
predictable, incremental changes to shadow and legitimate networks; or, the changes in
the formal and informal relationships within the legitimate and shadow networks may be
dramatic and unpredictable.
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One reason that the results may be dramatic and unpredictable is that co-optation
changes the nature of a leader-follower relationship extending from the formal legitimate
network into the shadow networks. An emergent leader appointed to a formal position of
authorify is vulnerable to charges of selling out, especially if the competition between
legitirnate and shadow networks is intense. Even if the leader is not accused of selling
out, the nature of the leader-follower relationship is profoundly changed. The
appointment of a leader to a formal position is an attempt to stack a formal superior-
subordinate relationship on top of the existing informal leader-follower relationship,
which resulted in the emergence of leadership, without losing the benefits of the informal
relationship. Leadership's emergence from an informal relationship is a matter of choice
for the followers based on trust (Beccone, 1998); formalizingthe relationship removes
the choice and may undermine the basis of the leader-follower relationship. Any
assumption that a popular leader can be easily moved into a formal institutional position
misses the irnportance of the other independent agents or'-followers" in the shadow
network. Formalizing a leader's authority may actually diminish that person's influence
in the existing informal networks if the leadership emergence was based upon opposition
to the formal organization. People selecting leaders for formal positions should be
cautious about situations where a leader may have emerged only on the basis of
outspoken direct opposition to management. That does not mean that selecting that
particular person will not be a successful approach, but the outcomes may be even more
unpredictable than they would be with leaders having more broadly-based support.
A second reason that co-optation may have unpredictable side effects is that
internalizing a new agent may entail unforeseen changes in the legitimate nefwork and in
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shadow management networks. In applied terms, this means that bringing a new person
into the formal managers group will change how that group functions. There will also be
changes in the dynamics of informal networks of managers. Selznik writes:
The significance of co-optation for organizational analysis is not simply that there
is a change in or a broadening of leadership, and that this is an adaptive response,
but also that this change is consequenttal for the character and role of the
organization...The character of the co-opted elements will necessarily shape
(inhibit or broaden) the modes of action available to the leadership which has won
adaptation and security at the cost of commitment. It is an adaptive response of a
cooperative system to a stable need, generating transformations which reflect
conskaints enforced by the recalcitrant tools of action (1948, p. 130).
Unpredictable changes in the legitimate nefwork and in the shadow networks are an
applied consequence of the participative nature of self organization and the
unpredictability inherent in applying CAS Theory as argued by Stacey, Griffin and Shaw
(2000).
Unpredictable changes emerging from attempts at cooptation are not necessarily
bad. Could an emergent leader assume a formal management position, and could that
approach still work? Yes, it could. Perhaps the best scenario would be if the emergent
Ieader develops new informal managerial networks while maintaining the existing
shadow network, allowing the leader to become a creative junction between shadow
networks and between shadow and legitimate networks. This would allow for
transmission of creative ideas and for a temporary alignment of the shadow and
legitimate networks. This scenario is possible, but it will not happen every time.
Practitioners need to accept that cooptation will produce an adaptation, but the adaptation
may be unpredictable and may yield favorable or unfavorable results based upon the
point of view of the evaluator.
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Changes in relationships initiated by co-optation extend beyond the legitimate and
shadow networks with which the leader interacts; the changes will affect the leader as
well. Interaction in formal and informal managers groups may initiate changes for or in
the co-opted leader. It is likely that in becoming part of the legitimate management
network, a person will also become part of an informal shadow nefwork within the group
of managers. This is described as a tendency to oligarchy (Michels, 1964). People in
positions of authority tend to flock together. According to Michels:
The technical specialization that inevitably results from all extensive organization
renders necessary what is called expert leadership. Consequently the power of
determination comes to he considered one of the specific attributes of leadership,
and is gradually withdrawn from the masses to be concentrated in the hands of the
leaders alone...Organization implies the tendency to oligarchy. In every
organization...the aristocratic tendency manifests itself very clearly (1964, p. 3l)
The tendency for a development of an aristocratic nefwork indicates that the patterns of
social interaction for the emergent leader, as a formal manager, are likely to change
significantly. There may be potentially predictable changes in orientation based upon
emerging patterns of social interaction. That is, over time, a leader appointed to a
management position might begin to intemalize the approaches and values of informal
management networks. That is important for the application of CAS theory because, if
the leader was selected as a change agent, it is possible that the orientation of the leader
toward meaningful change may be adversely affected. On the other hand, if co-optation
was a goal of the selection, the leader's socialization into a management network may be




Applied CAS Compared to Curuent Practice
Would the procedures and results likely differ from current practice? The assertion is that
using CAS theory will enable managers to influence networks in a desirable way. That
assumes an agent perspective, and agents' perspectives may differ. There may, for
example, be preference expressed for tighter or looser couplings. A particular person
may be appointed based upon a preference, and the desired meta-stable system-state may
or may not emerge. Because of the webby relational nature of CAS, there is no way to
determine a proximate cause (Stacey, Griffin, and Shaw, 2000; Holland 1998). Making
predictions is necessary for doing business but CAS cannot provide exact predictions;
Iikewise, one can look back and develop descriptions and hypotheses about what
happened in retrospect, but CAS theory can not isolate causes. The investigation of a
new executive and an organizational extinction by Marion and Bacon provides an
example; a new executive played a role in the process of organizational collapse, but
whether the executive was a cause or whether the executive's strategy was the only
chance in a lost cause is not answerable.
Applying complexity theory with the understanding that human organizations are
inherently unpredictable requires increasing the risk tolerance of people making leader
and manager selection decisions. The analysis of co-optation above provides an
interesting example. It is a case where taking the risk of selecting a leader for a
management position in the legitimate network will have unpredictable consequences for
the leader-follower relationships and for the structure and behavior of shadow and
legitimate networks. However, the self-organizing responses to the changes may have
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favorable results in terms of adapting the network to the environment. What is thought
of as "unpredictability" in control or management-oriented circles implies creativity from
a complexity perspective. Specific instances of creativify are not always beneficial in
terms of environmental adaptation, but creativify in general is inherent in human self-
organizing processes. People applying complexity theory reahze that creativity and
unpredictability are facts of life to which they must adapt.
Given the inherent creativity and unpredictability of self-organizing systems, the
gteatest change in terms of using CAS theory for selecting managers, from the
perspective of evaluating decisions, may be primarily ontological in terms of the means
of knowing and what is "looked for." There will be an emerging understanding that
managerial and leadership accountability is a webby and indeterminate problem (Marion,
1999). Leaders and managers are accountable for making good guesses, and even leaders
making good guesses sometimes fail. Some adaptations do not work; in some situations
no adaptation will work. Much like predicting which person will make the best manager
in a given situation, determining causes and effects is impossible frorn a scientific
perspective, so accountability will have to be determined inductively and intuitively - in
other words using educated guesses. This implies that what is learned is questionable,
relating in the abstract to thebounded rationality of agents within a CAS. One can never
know for certain whether one is learning the correct lesson for a future adaptation. This
perspective suggests unsettling consequences for the study of history, a topic that should
be explored in further research.
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Opportunities for Empirical Research
Given the unpredictability of systems inherent in the CAS framework, is it
possible to conduct empirical research that supports or contradicts normative conclusions
about the applicability of CAS theory to managerial hiring or its efficacy?
The answer to this question is "probably yes" but there will be limits to the
conclusions. One could, for instance, conduct empirical research on whether people
believe that application of CAS works. That approach would indicate satisfaction, which
would be an indicator of desirable influence, but it would not be a direct measure.
Another approach would be to observe several applications and count the perceived
successful to attempt a measure of the statistical probability of success. However, the
indeterminacy of cause inherent will create epistemic problems regardless of the
approach. CAS theory works very well for generating explanations and those
explanations may be very helpful in developing strategies, but it does not predict detailed
outcomes, nor does it isolate or identiff causation.
Implications for the Study of Leadership
The application of CAS theory to leadership and the distinction between leaders
and managers begs a clarification of concepts and terminology in the leadership studies
field. Zaleznlk and Beccone, for example, use somewhat different classifications of
relationship patterns to classi$r leaders versus managers. Managers are broadly though
of as leaders in areas where there is no distinction; perhaps emergent leaders and
managers are both subsets of a higher-level of influential adaptive agents. The
implication is that there may be many types of leadership which may be emergent from
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many patterns of relationships at different scales. Identiffing the patterns from which
particular leadership types tend to emerge would significantly advance the study of
leadership by providing a framework for classifying types identified in multiple
disciplines. For instance, seryant leadership, charismatic leadership, transformational
leadership and transactional leadership have all been identified as "types." Distinctions
between these types might be clarified by examining the emergent patterns of
relationships and adaptations typified by each.
It is important that as definitions rnore closely related to Complex Adaptive
Systems theory are developed, they are developed in a way that is, to some extent, value-
neutral. That is, the concept of leadership should not be equated with goodness,
regardless of whether the attributes discussed are of individuals or of relationships.
Michels wrote, "Leadership is a necessary phenomenon in every form of social life.
Consequently it is not the task of science to inquire whether this phenomenon is good or
evil, or predominantly one or the other" (1964, p. 37). If indeed leadership is endemic to
human social structures, a large part of self-organized behavior is inexplicable if only
"approved" behaviors or relationships are under consideration. There is no guarantee that
self-organization creates desirable organizational forms; classiffing undesirable forms
outside of leadership studies would do little to explain or prevent their formation.
It was remarked above that sometimes a revolution might be necessary to move a
network out of a static condition. It is a function of leadership to tighten couplings
enabling moving the network. Jay ( 1967) illustrated the potential for Machiavellian
underpinnings of tightly coupled organizations, implying leadership. A powerful CIO
might rotate managers frequently in divisions to keep the divisions weak, reserving
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power to the centralized management structure. Should the exercise of power in doing so
fall beyond the definition of leadership? In other words, does a leader automatically
revert to something else as soon as power is wielded, or can there be other kinds of
leadership relations besides those which are emergent from informal networks by choice
of the followers? Managers and emergent leaders both use opportunities to influence
adaptations in particular directions; the important distinction here is the relative direction
of alignment used to adapt to an environment. How that alignment is achieved, including
examining the use of persuasion and power through a CAS framework, is an important
issue for future works that could use the super classification and sub-classifications of
leadership mentioned above.
The distinction between managers and emergent leaders works is an important
component of any comprehensive effort to define leadership or to apply CAS theory to
organizations. CAS theory may be used to improve formal management selections based
on observed patterns in the environment and in the organization. Because managers and
leaders influence organizations in opposite directions of adaptation defined by the
relative looseness or tightness of network coupling, it is critical to understand the nature
of the environment and the internal pattems of relationships when selecting for formal
managernent positions. Using CAS theory to select between leaders and managers for
formal management positions has inherently unpredictable probabilistic consequences,
but the outcomes are more often than not likely to be better than making selections
without performing these evaluations. Applying leadership in increasingly concentrated,
competitive environments and management in increasingly dispersed and resource-sparse
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environments may yield excellent results, assuming that decision makers accept the
unpredictable nature of the approach.
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Notes
l. A major point of disagreement between European school and the Santa Fe school
is over the ability of theory to achieve "prediction." While not directly relevant to the
arguments presented in this paper, the debate between the European school and the Santa
Fe school of Complex Adaptive Systems theory has serious consequences for the
epistemology of cornplexity science and for how the science might be applied in other
areas
The European school argues that prediction is not attainable for human nefworks.
At least some level of prediction is necessary, however, to recognize emergent patterns.
The Santa Fe school argues that, because unpredictability is amplified by iteration,
prediction may be attained by looking for pafferns and shortening predictive time frames
(Holland, 1998). There is an important difference between types of measurements and
predictions; some are more precise and difficult than others. There is also a difference
between scientific prediction and "prediction" in the general probabilistic use of the term.
Practitioners using any probabilistic theory on a case by case basis are committing a
logical fallacy anyway; the determinant for success in most applications is what seems to
work. The arguments are extended below.
First, there is substantial disagreement about whether human organizations
actually are physical manifestations of CAS or whether CAS theory only provides
metaphors which may be used to focus research or applications (Zimmernan, Lindberg
& Plsek, 1998; Stacey, Griffin & Shaw, 2000).
The systems thinkers...developed models that they hold can be directly
applied to organizations. We argued in the previous chapter that this is an
invalid move if one is interested in significant change because it assumes
Formative Teleology, which cannot take account of the emerging novelty
We experience in organizational life or of human freedom. The
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evolutionary models . . .are of a very different kind, much closer to
Transformative Teleology in that they do model emerging novelty.
However, we believe, along with Prigogine and Allen, that this very
difference makes it just as impossible to apply evolutionary models to
human action...If a model takes on a life of its own, as it does in the
evolutionary models, then there can be no assurance that the model will
take on the sarne evolutionary pattern as the real life phenomenon it is
modeling. Any relevance such a model has will have to rely upon the
experience-based judgement of anyone who proposes to use it. Instead of
having value as direct application, the value of this kind of model lies only
in the insights it gives into the dynarnical properties of micro-interaction
between diverse entities in general... Diversity in human action arises
from human freedom and it is unlikely that human freedom can be
represented as statistical noise. As Pngogine quite explicitly says,
fluctuations and diversity do not just happen by chance, but require careful
explanation. The model then is only pointing to what requires further
explanation rather than having any direct value in application (Stacey,
Griffin & Shaw, 2000, pp. 102-3).
Rather than asserting that models cannot explain diversity in human behavior based upon
the assumption of human freedom, it would be much more elegant to simply find an
instance where implied patterns are regularly incorrectly predicted by the model. The
assumption and assertion are vulnerable to the argument that human freedom is an
emergent property of biologyl as such, it is insufficient to assume implicitly the opposite
of the anthropomorphic principle * that people are somehow inherently different in terms
of mind and agency from all other animals. Besides, Holland and others use game theory
and the assumption that agents adapt to each other based upon experience, rather than
using statistical noise, to produce self-organizing emergent effects (Holland, 1995 &
1998; Arthur, Durlauf, & Lane, 1997; Darley & Kauffman, 1997). Stacey, Griffin and
Shaw are holding others to requirements under which Stacey's complex responsive
processes also would not hold. The assertion is that models cannot explain diversity; but
the assertion does not apply to the kind of model Holland uses (bounded rationality,
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where agents try but cannot always predict the behavior of other agents) nor is the
assertion supported by any evidence beyond asserting human uniqueness. Holland's
model does explain novehy and diversity in behavior, given that organisms attempt to
predict each other's behavior with limited success.
The critique is further weakened because Stacey, Gnffin and Shaw miss
Holland's point. They write:
"He holds that emergent patterns are predictable and regular. He accepts
the long-term unpredictability of complex systems but claims that this
does not matter because the scientist should focus on levels of detail and
time spans for which predictability is possible. He dismisses the
importance of long-term unpredictability and holds that it is possible to get
through focusing on the short term. Holland holds that if the current state
of model is specified then that state, processed through the structure of the
model, determines the next state, which in turn determines the state after
that. He claims that the only uncertainty relates to the appropriateness of
the level of detail in which the current state is specified, and to the
faithfulness of the correspondence between the model and reality. In other
words, uncertainty lies in the interpretations that the modeler makes of a
deterministic reality" (2000, p. I l0).
The suggestion is that Holland's view of complex adaptive systems, including
human systems, is purely deterministic - that people are no different than
deterministic phenomena like weather.
Ironically, Holland (1998) explicitly makes those observations about models
using weather as a metaphor. He uses a deterministic chaos phenomenon with a
similartty to an adaptive human network - to make the points that repetitive general
pattems are identifiable and that recurrent patterns enable probabilistic predictions that
may be useful despite a lack of precision. Butterfly effect in meteorology is cumulative;
therefore time is inversely proportional to predictive accuracy - for deterministic chaos.
Thus, the usefulness of identiffing patterns is similar in both chaotic and complex
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adaptive systems. However, Holland's CAS model is not evidence of simple formative
teleology, rather it is similar to the concept of complex responsive processes in using
bounded rationality - the inabilify of the agents to predict the actions of the other agents.
On the preceding page of Emergence: from chaos to order, Holland emphasizes
the difficulty in predicting behaviors in networks where all of the agents are behaving
based upon attempts to predict each others' behavior:
Even if that observer knows the initial strategies and the details of the
individual leaming procedures, it is next to impossible to predict the
course of the game. Emergence and perpetual novelty are ever present in
games where the opponents are adapting to each other (Holland, 1998, p.
42).
Holland's weather reference, explicitly identified as a'hseful simile," is used to
demonstrate that beyond the localized nnpredictability there are recognizable patterns that
are somewhat predictable at higher scales - like frontal systems in meteorology. This
defines emergence from a participant/observer or agenUobseryer perspective;
"Still, by attending to selected details, we can usually extract recurring
patterns, like fronts in the complex unfolding sequence. When these
recurring patterns are regularly associated with events of interest, we call
them emergenl properties" (Holland, 1998, p. 45).
Emergent leadership would be impossible to identifii were it not a recurring
pattem.
Holland's description of systems of agents basing individual behaviors
upon strategies constructed from predictions of other agent behaviors describes
general patterns of relationships and processes endemic to human organizations
and very similar to Stacey's concept of complex responsive processes. An
important reply to Stacey, Griffin, and Shaw's assertion of unpredictabilify is that
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Holland's method has been applied successfully by other practitioners of the
Santa Fe school to predict consumer credit behavior and personal bankruptcies
and for chemical process control, fraud detection and scheduling for large process
centers.
That kind of quantifiable scientific prediction isn't necessary for a model
informing leader and manager selection using pattern recognition. There is an
important distinction between "prediction" in the scientific sense versus
"prediction" in the vernacular. First, there is a distinction between levels of
measurement when we are dealing with scientific prediction; scientific prediction
implies that specific causes and effects can be identified; correlation may imply
influence and probabilistic conditions without the abilify to identiff specific
causes or specific effects. For instance, people who smoke cigarettes are more
likely than others to conkact lung cancer, but it is not possible to identiff which
individual smokers will get the disease, Simple co;rrelation in the scientific,
statistical sense allows people to make "predictions" in the common sense of the
term, or "educated guesses," or predictions with "bounded rationality." Applying
correlation is an inference that a relationship exists, even if it isn't scientifically
validated. People predict that quitting smoking reduces the chance of getting Iung
cancer. Even Stacey's "complex responsive processes" explanation requires that
people make "predictions" at a nominal level in the common sense of the term.
Therefore, an absolute position on CAS unpredictability in the scientific sense
rather than upon probability is absurd in practice. Experience demonstrates the
necessity of people, human "agents," making predictions about their own
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behavior and the behaviors of others constantly. We make predictions based on
probability when we order pizzas', the pizzas will be probably delivered within a
given time; they will be probably prepared and cooked as we ordered; the price
will probably be as advertised.
Without prediction in the general sense, hurnan networks as we know
them would cease. Prediction is one of the bases of social construction and of
culfure - predicting shared meanings and behaviors is necessary to maintain
society. If we could not predict behaviors based upon shared meanings, there
would be no way to veriff them; we would not be able to assume continuity of
meaning. Because Stacey's model of complex responsive processes relies upon
shared meanings (Stacey, 2001), it requires that participants make predictions.
The idea that processes are responsive based upon experience also implies
predictions. Trust, one of the bases for emergent leadership (Beccone, 1998), is
another form of prediction; it is a reliance on the future behavior of others based
upon experience.
In CAS, agency implies agent make predictions.
"Agency implies choice and choice in turn implies alternative possible
states of the system. Thus agency only makes sense in complex adaptive
systems that are capable of generating multiple alternative representations
for themselves. Only such systems are capable of agency" (Boisot &
Cohen, 2000, p. 130).
Agents in CAS must make predictive choices. They must consider alternative future
conditions and select members for "legitimate" networks accordingly. A hiring "agent" is
looking for a way to make a predictive decision, selecting an agent that will influence the
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continuous self-organization of legitimate and shadow network(s) into desirable bounded
equilibrium states.
What kind of prediction is required for applying abstract complexity theory to
leader or manager selection? The emergence of higher level patterns from lower scales
of analysis has been mentioned, and it has been suggested that the patterns tend to be
probabilistic. Therefore there needs to be a way to apply observed patterns to selection
decisions. Some analysis from the "Santa Fe School" of Complexify Theory has gone to
the ratio-level of measurement and prediction for strategic decisions based upon
probabilistic aggregate phenomena where discrete numeric values could be derived - like
financial markets (Ditlea, 1997; Wakefield, 2001). At the tactical level of individual
managerial hiring or promotion cases, however, there are no valid discrete numerical
values to be assigned. The measure of success or failure is nominal.
Even if there were valid predictive theories for use in hiring managers, their use
would be fallacious in tactical implementations because inferential statistics describe
aggregate potential; individual cases are probabilistic - or "quantum" phenomena as
described by Beccone - in the sense that the physical states only emerge under
observation (1998). There is only a "result" if a candidate is selected, and there is only a
comparable result if all candidates are selected. Predicting an individual case from
aggregate statistics is fallacious. Yet people constantly make individual predictions
based upon aggregate experience; the process of human organizational life is a continuing
logical fallacy where the best inductive guides - aggregate experiences applied to
individual decisions - are fallacious. Thus, individual tactical hiring decisions are
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necessarily made on the basis of a logical fallacy whether they use applied science,
scientific metaphors, or nothing of the sort.
A tactical hiring decision in an organization is analogous to testing a singular
hypothesls about a nominal-level measurement in science; in a single case, given a set of
conditions (object attributes, relationships, approaches, and/or environmental variables)
will the applicant "work out?" Even with a solid, predictive "leadership" test, each hiring
decision would be a test case of the probabilistic theory to be aggregated with other test
cases to test the theory against the aggregate. The theory can only really be applied over
a large number of cases. The academic debate over the ability to achieve scientific or
positivistic prediction is essentially irrelevant to a practitioner who will make individual
hiring and promotion decisions based on non-scientific predictions (informed guesses or
hypotheses) employing hypothetical explanations. This situation maps to agents in CAS;
they adapt based upon experience, implicitly predicting future success. Successful
adaptation is amplified; unsuccessful adaptation is eventually removed; success or failure
is unpredictable for a given agent. The problem, then, is for agents to find explanations
that improve inductive predictions; explanations may be carefully mapped positivistic
models or indirect metaphors as long as they are perceived to work. Consensus around
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